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This paper assesses reserve management for determining optimal or minimal reserves for an oil 
producing economy under dynamic uncertainty. Reserve benchmarks are formulated taking into 
consideration the amount of contingent liabilities in foreign exchange that arises during currency 
crises. These contingent liabilities are derived based on the analogy between holding domestic 
money and possessing a financial option whose payoff depends on the expected behavior of oil 
proceeds. When reserve accumulation has an opportunity cost in terms of capital goods, an 
optimum level of reserves can be established, given the capability of reserves to delay and mitigate 
currency crises. Alternatively, when reserves constitute the best means to accumulate country 
wealth, an appropriate minimal reserve level may be calculated. In this case, reserves act as an 
instrument of self-insurance that guarantees honoring a selected amount of foreign exchange claims 
at the time of a crisis. Econometric estimates for Venezuela show reasonable numerical values for 
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Manejo de Reservas Internacionales en una Economía Petrolera: 















Este trabajo analiza el manejo de reservas para determinar reservas óptimas o mínimas para una 
economía petrolera en un contexto con incertidumbre dinámica. Estos niveles referenciales de 
reservas son formulados tomando en consideración los pasivos contingentes en moneda extranjera 
que emergen durante las crisis cambiarias. Estos pasivos contingentes son derivados basados en la 
analogía entre mantener moneda doméstica y poseer una opción financiera cuyo payoff depende del 
comportamiento esperado de los ingresos petroleros. Cuando la acumulación de reservas tiene un 
costo de oportunidad en términos de bienes de capital, un nivel de reservas óptimo puede der 
determinado, dada la capacidad de las reservas para retardar y mitigar las crisis cambiarias. 
Alternativamente, cuando las reservas son el mejor medio para acumular la riqueza de un país, un 
nivel mínimo de reservas puede ser calculado. En este caso, las reservas actúan como un 
instrumento de auto-aseguramiento que garantiza honrar un monto seleccionado de obligaciones en 
moneda extranjera al momento de una crisis. Las estimaciones para Venezuela muestran valores 






With their spectacular rise to more than 3 trillion dollars in the past 20 years, 
foreign reserves have become a worldwide emblem of global imbalances in trade and 
finance flows. On one hand, they may be considered the mirror image of the record 
expansion of U.S. foreign deficit and its corresponding debt. On the other hand, they 
may be taken to reflect the growing concern of governments and central banks on 
currency instability and currency crises. So far, as most of the literature on the subject 
notices, foreign reserve accumulation has been mostly the result of passive policies, 
i.e. prudent, but residual accumulation of foreign exchange surpluses to protect the 
country from a “rainy day”. Neither from the point of view of financial returns, nor 
from that of risk management, the choice of foreign currency accumulation or its 
allocation to financial assets appears to have followed a rational policy model. 
The present paper addresses the policy question of foreign reserve accumulation in 
an oil economy as a case study of development planning under macroeconomic risk. 
Risk, in this paper, relates to the threat of currency crises, which are driven by the 
conditions of dynamic uncertainty that characterize foreign exchange markets. The 
approach proposed is based on the idea that an adequate level of foreign reserves can 
be defined either as an optimal level for mitigating currency crisis or as a minimal 
self-insurance level. Optimality arises because foreign reserves can be seen as an 
asset that competes with the allocation of the country’s income flow in capital goods, 
but also as an asset that has the property to counterbalance latent liabilities that result 
from agents’ financial valuation of two alternative assets -domestic and foreign 
currency-. In this case, the essential role assigned to reserves is that of discouraging 
potential foreign exchange claims against the Central Bank. For the case of a minimal 
level, reserves are exclusively used to reduce the exposure to risk according to the 
explicit preferences of policymakers. 
The determination of these foreign exchange contingent liabilities at an aggregate 
level builds the connection of this paper with real option theory, generating also 
further implications for macroeconomic planning. According to Dixit and Pyndick 
(1991), the option value of any commodity determines the speculative component 
that contributes to explaining its contingent value. In the case of domestic money, this 
option value reflects the difference between the opportunity of buying foreign 
exchange today and the decision of keeping domestic currency. That is, holding 
liquid balances denominated in domestic currency embeds a right to convert them 
into foreign currency or other assets denominated in foreign money, creating the 
analogy with possessing a financial option. In this context, contingent liabilities 
against the Central Bank arise from considering the intertemporal valuation of the 
option to convert domestic into foreign assets. 
Because domestic and foreign money are related through the concept of a financial 
option, a crucial role is played by depreciation expectations on the domestic currency. 
At the same time, these depreciation expectations will depend on the soundness of the 
fundamentals of an oil economy, which can be ultimately described by the 
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expectations formed around the behavior of the country’s foreign earnings (oil 
revenues). These two elements lead to assert that the expected depreciation of the 
domestic currency and contingent foreign liabilities rely on the uncertainty about the 
future performance of these earnings. However, the chances of experiencing currency 
crises, and their effect on the country wealth can be mitigated and delayed by the 
accumulation of international reserves, which act as an instrument of deterrence for 
speculators’ attacks by reducing any depreciation expectations held by private agents.  
In the literature, Heller (1966) was the first to cast the analysis of reserve demand 
in the context of precautionary behavior. Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) also derived 
optimal reserves under the notion that reserves serve as a buffer that smoothes out the 
stochastic fluctuations of external transactions. The idea that reserves act as an 
instrument of self-insurance was mainly developed by the literature that followed the 
financial crises of the 1990’s, with papers such as, Feldstein (1999), and Kletzer and 
Mody (2000). More recently, Aizenman and Lee (2005) and Jeanne and Rancière 
(2006) focus on the idea that reserves act as self-insurance because they minimize the 
costs of adjustments related to the occurrence of sudden stops. García and Soto 
(2004), instead, center the discussion on exploiting the potential of reserves to reduce 
the likelihood of a sudden stop, and not to diminish the cost of adjustment itself. Lee 
(2004) takes a different approach and determines the optimal coverage for self-
insurance by computing the insurance value of reserves using real option theory.  
We center our attention on the idea that reserves can delay the occurrence of 
currency crises as in García and Soto (2004), but we use the real option theory to 
derive the link between crises and the uncertainty exhibited by foreign exchange 
proceeds of the country. Implicitly, our model can also be seen as a way to analyze 
the sustainability of monetary policies in a condition where no fiscal base is available 
except for a primary sector (Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung, 2007). 
  The structure of the paper is the following. First, in section 2, we explain the 
analogy of holding domestic currency with possessing a financial option, and include, 
as a particular case, the value of an option in the presence of a dual exchange rate. 
Then we derive the amount of contingent liabilities for the general case, and in 
section 4 we provide the definition of wealth for an oil economy. In section 5, we 
address the problem of reserve management by deriving the expressions for 
computing optimal and minimal reserves. Finally, in section 6, we give parameters 
estimates and show the numerical calculations for the Venezuelan economy.  
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2. Domestic money as a financial option 
 
2.1. The general case 
  
Consider the case of a country whose domestic currency is subject to a loss of 
external purchasing power. From the point of view of individuals, holding liquid 
balances denominated in domestic currency embeds the right, but not the obligation, 
to convert them into foreign currency or other assets denominated in foreign money. 
More precisely, at any given time, individuals have the possibility of switching their 
holdings of domestic money into foreign currency at the current exchange rate or 
waiting up to a future time, let the purchasing power of domestic money deteriorate, 
and make the conversion at a different (probably higher) exchange rate1. Because 
agents are constantly faced with such choice, we can say that holding domestic 
money is equivalent to possessing a call option on foreign assets, or analogously, to 
possessing a put option on domestic currency, i.e. an option to exit from domestic 
currency by acquiring foreign assets at the ongoing exchange rate. Therefore, the 
decision to buy foreign currency is equivalent to deciding when to exercise such an 
option.  
Define Fi as the current value of the call (put) option, i.e. the value assigned by a 
single individual to maintaining open the possibility of buying foreign currency in the 
future (or selling long positions of domestic currency)2. If we rule out arbitrage 
opportunities, the maximum value for Fi is the gain that the individual would obtain 
by selling the domestic currency at the current exchange rate with respect to the 
(lower) value that he would obtain by selling the same amount at a rate fully 
reflecting the depreciation of the currency. Like with any financial option, as Fi gets 
larger, the incentives for individuals to exercise their option are greater. Ideally, the 
individual would want to exercise this option when the difference between the value 
of foreign assets at the current exchange rate and the one at the expected exchange 
rate is so large that it would not be justifiable to wait for a reversal3.  
Consider that each individual (the ith operator) holds a fraction wi of the stock of 
high powered money in Bs (M0) that can eventually be converted into foreign 























1 The exchange rate is defined as the price of the foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, e.g. Bs/$. 
2 Because conversion can happen at any time without any given expiration date, this real option would be equivalent to 
an American perpetual option. 
3 Nevertheless, on the basis of the “good news principle” of Bernanke (1983), the put option can be expected to be 
exercised when the operators believe that the best possible outcome has already occurred and no improvement of the 
situation can be expected. 
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where   represents the current exchange rate (units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency), and De is the expected annual rate of variation of the exchange rate 
in a year, i.e. the expected rate of depreciation  of the domestic currency. In this 
expression, 

0Mwi  represents the current value of assets in foreign currency that 
could be bought at the current exchange rate with an amount wiM0 of domestic 
money. The second term indicates the value of the assets in foreign exchange that 
would be obtained, by converting an amount wiM0 of domestic money using the 
expected exchange rate ( tD
e
e ) at the exercise time t. This difference represents the 
gain that the individual would obtain by converting her domestic currency long 
positions at the current rate, rather than at the depreciated rate  tD
e
e . 
Given that all individuals in the economy hold domestic money, the aggregate 
payoff of the option is simply =
i
iFF , provided that  =
i
iw 1.  A linearization of 
equation (1) can be stated as: 
 

















M =  is the high powered money of the economy in foreign currency 
(dollars) at the current exchange rate. Expression (2) indicates that the current value 
of the implicit option is equal to the expected loss of purchasing power (in terms of 
foreign exchange) that holders of domestic money face. Therefore, an increase in the 
expected depreciation of the domestic currency will increase the value of the option, 
and the incentives to exercise it. Also notice that, the intrinsic value of this option is 
different than zero, only for expectations of depreciation, since appreciation 
expectations induce agents to keep their holdings of domestic money and drive the 
value of the option to zero. For a higher level of the high powered money, the value 
of the option increases as well due to the greater base over which the expected loss is 
computed.   
In any economy, the expected depreciation rate of the domestic currency typically 
depends on fundamentals, which can be thought as fiscal or financial indicators that 
signal the degree of soundness of the economy. In an economy whose foreign 
receipts depend essentially on the state oil exports, fundamentals ultimately rely on 
the expected oil revenues, which affect the performance of the fiscal variables and 
also determine the state of real economy and the financial system. This description is 
especially accurate, if the economy does not utilize any saving mechanism to buffer 
oil shocks, as it is the case for Venezuela. 
On the other hand, an expected accumulation of reserves can play an important 
role in this type of economy by signaling lower vulnerability to currency crises. 
Models such as Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Sims (2001) provide 
theoretical background to explain the negative relationship between the occurrence of 
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external crises and the accumulation of international reserves. For instance, in Sachs, 
Tornell and Velasco (1996) agents observe the level of international reserves to 
determine whether capital outflows can occur without causing a balance of payment 
crisis. The story from this model is that when a country faces weak fundamentals, the 
probability of occurrence of a crisis due to self-fulfilling prophecies is higher if 
reserves are low. In the same line of reasoning, Sims (2001) in a stylized model of a 
small economy, shows that explosives paths of prices (i.e., the exchange rate) can be 
ruled out if the Central Bank commits to maintain enough reserves to back up the 
quantity of money in the economy.  
Based on these elements, and acknowledging the role of time in forming 
expectations, the general form of the expected depreciation rate of the domestic 














D  is the expected depreciation rate of the domestic currency (not reflected in 
the current exchange rate) formed with the information set available at time t-1, 
0
D  is 
an autonomus annual rate of depreciation, eyt  E(yt - yt-1) is the expected change in 
oil revenues for the year and e rt is the expected accumulation of reserves for the 
same period. For g, h>0, this function indicates that as expected oil earnings and 
reserves increase, the expected depreciation diminishes because agents perceive a 
more robust economy. It also implies that the effect of negative oil shocks on the 
exchange rate can be counterbalanced by hoarding larger reserves. Alternatively, one 
could argue that oil booms increase government profligacy to over-expand its 
expenditure causing a greater demand of foreign assets and a larger depreciation of 
the currency. In this case g<0, but an expected increase in international reserves could 
still be stabilizing for the economy by reducing depreciation expectations (h>0)4.  
Incorporating the particular form of the exchange rate depreciation in (3), the 
aggregate current value of an option varies in time according to: 
 














Assuming that g, h>0, this expression shows that for an oil economy, an increase 
in expected oil receipts and reserve accumulation will reduce the incentives for 
individuals to exercise the existing call option on foreign assets, by reducing its 
current payoff. It also shows that accumulating reserves can be seen as a way to deter 
foreign exchange claims that come from the conversion of domestic money liabilities 





4 If reserve accumulation were also destabilizing (h<0), then the accumulation of reserves could not be understood as a 
mean to protect the economy from external shocks, making any consideration regarding reserve management useless. 
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2.1. The dual exchange rate case 
 
Oil economies that have not implemented saving mechanisms to buffer oil shocks 
are typically subject to cycles of accumulation/desaccumulation of reserves that 
reflect the rollercoaster behavior of oil prices in combination with policies of fixing 
the nominal exchange rate.  It can also be common that, in the downward phase of 
reserves, exchange rate controls are established as a way to evade an explicit 
depreciation of the domestic currency that would re-balance the ongoing current 
account deficit and that would stop capital flights. In other words, one can interpret 
exchange rate controls as an attempt at insulating reserves from a transitory negative 
shock in the supply of foreign exchange that does not want to be resolved with a 
temporary depreciation. In this section, we derive the particular form of the above 
option assuming that financial transactions are actively restricted by exchange rate 
controls.  
These types of controls typically imply a form of a dual exchange rate system in 
which part of commercial transactions (imports) are priced at the official exchange 
rate ( ), while the rest of transactions (mostly financial) take place in a parallel 
market at the exchange rate ( )5. Provided always that   , an exchange rate 
premium ( 1−= 

p ) arises to reflect the fact that the state centralizes the allocation 
of foreign currency and there is rationing in the official supply of foreign exchange 
for importers through licensing.  
The official exchange rate is fixed by the authorities and we assume that does not 
change while the dual system is in place. The current level of the parallel exchange 
rate is basically determined by the supply and demand of foreign exchange for 
financial transactions. In particular, the expected depreciation rate in this market can 
have the same determinants as in the case of a floating or semi-fixed exchange rate 
described in equation (3). 
One could argue that in the official exchange rate market, by over invoicing 
imports, a fraction of oil proceeds devoted to imports will be diverted to the parallel 
market, especially as the premium between the official and the parallel market grows. 
As in Guidotti (1988), this diversion of resources implies that there is an imperfect 
separation between the official and the parallel market that allows a certain degree of 
“leakages” in the system. 
Taking into consideration all the above elements, the current value of the option on 
foreign assets can be written as: 
 
























5 All exchange rates are expressed as quantities of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, for instance Bs/$. 
 9 






q ii −+  represents the average current value 
of assets in foreign currency that could be bought with an amount wiM0 of domestic 
money, considering the existence of a dual system. Since in this system there is an 
imperfect separation between the official and the parallel market, q represents the 
probability of obtaining a dollar at the official exchange rate ( ) if agents decided to 
liquidate their Bs long positions. Symmetrically, 1-q represents the probability of 
obtaining a dollar at the parallel exchange rate ( ). In other words, q can be 
described as the relative amount of financial transactions whose supply of foreign 
exchange is diverted from the official market. Intuitively, as the degree of financial 
leakages in the system increases, this fraction q should tend to rise. It will also rise, 
for instance, if the government intervenes in the parallel market trying to avoid an 
excessive gap between the official and the parallel rate by selling dollars at a price 
extremely close to the official rate.  
The term ( )tD
v
Mw ei −10  of expression (5) indicates the value of assets in 
foreign exchange that would be obtained, by converting an amount wiM0 of domestic 
money using the expected exchange rate at the exercise time. This expected exchange 
rate would be the one resulting from increasing the current average exchange rate 
prevailing in the economy ( v ) by the expected depreciation rate ( eD ).  This expected 
exchange rate is also the unique exchange rate that would arise from the 
abandonment of the dual system, which collapses as all the operators (or, in practice, 
a sufficiently large number of them) exercise their right and try to convert the stock 
of domestic assets into foreign exchange.  
Since v is defined as the current average exchange rate prevailing in the economy, 
we could assume that ( ) qqv −+= 1 , or it could also be expressed as a proportion 
of the current official exchange rate ( fv  ), where ( )( )pqqf +−+= 11  is a 
scalar necessarily greater than 1. The aggregate payoff of the option, provided that 
 =
i
iw 1, can be written as: 
 
(6) ( )  += tDMDF ee $
0







0 =  is the high powered money of the economy in dollars at the current 
















qfP  is a term that can be interpreted as 
an indicator of the state of the dual system at the crisis point, corrected by the 
exchange rate premium.  
In expression (6), note that if q=1 and f=1, or equivalently 0=  and f=1, this 
would correspond in practice to the elimination of the dual system, or a dual system 
with almost no restrictions on financial transactions. In this case, all transactions are 
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undertaken at the official exchange rate, P is equal to zero, and the formula reduces to 
the original case shown in equation (2). Alternatively, for the case of a dual system 
with no leakages, q=0 and 
=f , the value of P becomes also zero, but the 
quantity of high powered money is expressed in terms of dollars converted at the 
parallel exchange rate ( ). In this last instance, the current value of the option can 
also be written as: 
 
















10   for De>0 
which indicates that higher current values of the parallel exchange rate ( ), and 
therefore of the exchange rate premium ( p ), dissuade individuals to exercise their 
option of buying foreign assets today. This is the case because, part of the 
devaluation expectations for the official exchange rate have already materialized in 
the parallel market, and the actual devaluation rate is the difference between the 
current parallel exchange rate and the unique expected exchange rate when the dual 
system will be abandoned. 
Notice that in both extreme cases, an elimination of the dual system (q=1) or a 
dual system with no leakages (q=0), the term P drops to zero, but for 10  q , P is 
positive and maximizes the incentives to exercise the implicit  option as 21→q . 
This non-linearity of P on q seems to show that the mere existence of a dual system 
with two simultaneous meaningful prices would exacerbate depreciation 
expectations6.  On the other hand, the effect of the exchange rate premium ( p ) on P 
is strictly positive ( ( ) 0)1/(2)1(/ 2 ++−=  pppqqpP ). This suggests that a 
greater premium will induce a larger instantaneous gain that will push individuals to 
exercise their option, especially as 21→q .   
With respect to government interventions in the parallel market, which can be 
thought as increasing the value of q by selling dollars at the official exchange rate, 
these interventions might be counterproductive, if the initial value of 21q , that is, if 
most transactions are already priced at the parallel exchange rate. Nonetheless, 
because the sale of foreign exchange by the government can also be understood as an 
increase in the supply of dollars, an appreciation in the parallel exchange rate should 
occur as well, for instance as 00  qD . Therefore, we find that a government 
intervention in the parallel market might be successful, even for an initial 21q , if 
the appreciation of parallel exchange rate is greater than the increase in P due to the 
increase in q, or equivalently:  
  












6 P has a maximum in at q=0.5, since 0 qP   for q<0.5 and 0 qP   for q>0.5. 
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3. Contingent liabilities on reserves 
 
So far, we have compared holding domestic currency with acquiring a financial 
option, and we have provided an explicit expression for the current payoff of such 
option. Since these payoffs are tied to the future performance of oil receipts, in the 
context of stochastic uncertainty for oil proceeds, agents’ decision to exercise their 
option will depend on the inter-temporal valuation of the payoffs that could be 
generated upon. This means that we can find an expression that computes the price of 
the option, and determines its exit value, in terms of oil proceeds.  
We start by assuming that development of the oil activity occurs under dynamic 
uncertainty. This implies that, as a consequence of a plurality of concurring factors, 
both the average value and the variance of oil revenue tends to increase over time. 
Adopting the convenient assumption of a geometric Brownian process, we thus 
assume that oil production  yields a net cash flow formed by a systematic part, which 
is normalized to unity, and a stochastic part, denoted by y, observable in every period, 
evolving according to the expression: 
 
(9) dzydtydy ttt  +=  
 
where   represents the drift (constant trend component) of  oil earnings, 2  their 
(constant instantaneous) variance, and dz is a normally distributed random variable 
that satisfies E(dz)=0 and E(dz2) = dt. We also define  −= , and assume that 
  , being   the discount rate in equation (10). 
From the point of view of its holders, the price of the option is the one that solves 
the dynamic valuation of the payoff of buying foreign currency (or exiting domestic 
currency): 
 























       
where  yyE =0  is the operator that takes expectations conditional on the available 
information at time zero regarding the oil income, and V is the price of the option 
represented by the maximum expected present worth of the option value held by all 
individuals at any time. At the time the option is exercised, V represents the aggregate 
value of foreign assets claimed against the foreign exchange (reserves) held by the 
Central Bank. This is the case because, when individuals exercise their option, the 
Central Bank provides the foreign currency in exchange for domestic money. At any 
other time, V is interpreted as the aggregate contingent foreign exchange liabilities 
that could materialize against international reserves. 
To solve this general class of valuations, the following standard dynamic 
programming conditions need to be satisfied (Dixit and Pyndick, 1994): 
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(12)   ( ) *)(~** yFyV =   
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where ( )yV *  is the solution to the optimization problem, y* is the level of foreign 
exchange earnings at which operators abandon the domestic currency, )(
~
yF  is the 
expected present value of the  option, and (11) and (12) represent the value matching 
and the smooth pasting condition respectively. If arbitrage possibilities are exhausted, 
all operators are identical, except for the fact that they hold different shares of 
domestic money, so that they all exercise their option at y*. When this happens, a 
currency crisis occurs. 
Using the aggregate current value of the option derived in expression (4), we have 
that: 
 







































=~  represents the present value of the annual expected (constant) accumulation 
of reserves, or equivalently, a once and for all change in the current stock of 
international reserves. Since   ( ) ( ) tttt eyeeyeyyyyE  01000 1 −− −=−== , 
then we can define ( )( )−−= egG 1  and let y  refer to the present value of a 
constant annual oil income.  
Condition (11) is satisfied by the general class of solutions ( ) yAyV =* . 
Assuming ( ) yAyV =*  and manipulating terminal conditions (12) and (13), the 
value y* is given by: 
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Implicitly, the value of y* determines the probability of occurrence of a crisis, i.e. 
the probability that y falls under y*, and therefore, the average waiting time for 
individuals to exercise their option. For any <0 or >1, if G>0, this expression 
suggests that a larger autonomous expected depreciation will increase the exit value 
y*, and therefore, on average, rise the probability of a crisis and decrease the waiting 
time for individuals to exercise their option. Also, since h>0, an accumulation of 
foreign reserves will decrease the exit value, and imply on average, a smaller 
probability of a currency crisis7.  Therefore, because reserve accumulation 
simultaneously increases the waiting time for individuals to exercise their option and 
reduces the probability of a currency crisis, it can be understood as a mechanism to 
delay currency crises by discouraging speculators’ attacks.  
Substituting y* back into the smooth pasting condition, we find that the solution 
for the total value of contingent claims is: 
 
(16)  ( )









































0      for y y*   
 
where β has two roots: 1
1
  and 0
2
  that satisfy the characteristic equation   
0)()1(
2
1 2 =−−+−  . Notice that 0V  only for 0 , which constrains 
our solution to using 
2
 = . For this case, and h, G>0, the value of total contingent 
claims against the Central Bank is a decreasing function of the present value of oil 
proceeds and reserve accumulation, and an increasing function of the autonomous 
expected depreciation 0
~
D . This shows that reserve accumulation also acts as an 
instrument to mitigate the effect of currency crisis by reducing the amount of foreign 
exchange liabilities that can materialize. 
To understand solutions (16)-(17), consider the case in which the accumulation of 
reserves have already been decided by the authorities to an arbitrary level. Given 
these reserves and the other conditions of the economy ( 0
~
D ), we can know the level 
of income y* that triggers a currency crisis (when operators decide to convert 
domestic currency into foreign exchange). At this point, only the behavior of income 
determines the occurrence of such crisis. If income falls under y*, the crisis instantly 
takes place with the amount of liabilities determined by (17). If income is higher than 
y*, operators do not exercise their option, but there is a threat over reserves identical 
to the amount of contingent liabilities pointed out by (16).  
 
7 If 0G ,  expression (15) will be greater than zero, only if, for 0h , 0
~~ Drh  , i.e. only if the beneficial effect of 
accumulating reserves is sufficiently large with respect to the autonomous depreciation expectations. In other words, 
since oil proceeds have a destabilizing effect, the accumulation of reserves needs to be sufficiently high to cause 
appreciation expectations. However, if these appreciation expectations are too strong, paradoxically the probability of a 
crisis increases. 
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The explicit expression for the negative root and its derivative with respect to the 
























































































Expression (19) is positive for   , a  condition that always holds for 0 , 
since by definition  −= . Therefore, as volatility increases, the absolute value of 
the root gets smaller and the amount of liabilities increases. Likewise, a smaller 
absolute value of the root reduces the exit value y*, indicating a smaller probability of 
a currency crisis. Statistically this happens because, as uncertainty increases, the 
probability of getting an instantaneous positive jump (drift) in income also increases, 
which is equivalent to saying that the probability of a crisis decreases. Nonetheless, if 




4. Wealth in an oil economy 
 
In this section, we model the wealth of an economy that obtains most of its foreign 
exchange earnings from the extraction of oil. The resource is developed by the state, 
which can decide to keep international reserves or to import capital goods in order to 
accumulate productive assets. Individuals can also claim part of these oil earnings as 
savings in foreign exchange or as consumption of foreign goods.  
Since there are only two assets in the economy, the intertemporal country wealth 
depends on the future accumulation and returns of these assets: 
 

















where W0 is the initial wealth,   is the return of the domestic investment in capital 
goods per year, and    is the annual rate of return of reserves. That is, the expected 
country wealth is defined as the expected present value of the asset accumulation in 
the economy. 
Because capital goods are not produced domestically and oil proceeds are the only 
source of foreign exchange, the inter-temporal budget constraint of the economy is 
given by the present value of the balance of payment: 
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where y  is the opportunity cost of depleting the natural resource8,  OO =~ , 
CC =~  and II =~  are the present value of  the expected (constant) annual financial 
outflows and imports of consumption and capital goods respectively. This expression 
points out that the present value of uses of foreign exchange (imports of consumption 
and capital goods, capital outflows and reserve accumulation) cannot exceed the 
present value of the expected oil proceeds. 
Contingent liabilities derived in the preceding section represent, during currency 
crises, capital flights defined as the massive exchange of domestic money claims for 
foreign currency. The rest of the time, contingent liabilities characterize a threat over 
reserves that can be partially materialized depending on the exchange rate policy 
followed by the authorities. In this sense, we can define the present value of expected 
capital outflows (O
~
) as a fraction k of the contingent liabilities. Also, the term kV can 
be thought as a measure of the disruptive effects that a crisis can engender on the real 
economy. 
Substituting out the present value of capital goods in expression (21), the expected 
wealth of the economy is:  
 





















     
The first addendum to the initial wealth W0 represents the gains on wealth obtained 
by the transformation of oils proceeds into the stock of capital goods of the economy. 
This gain is positively related to the stock of natural resources and negatively related 
to the accumulated consumption of imported goods. The second addendum indicates 
the direct net expected contribution of reserves of foreign exchange to the country 
wealth. This contribution is proportional to the difference between the financial 
return earned by reserves and the rate of return that can be obtained by importing 
investment goods or by investing abroad. The third term on the right hand side 
represents the potential depletion of wealth (i.e. the contingent liability) that may 
come from the financial decisions of private agents, should they choose to convert 
their claims of domestic currency onto foreign exchange. This contingent reduction in 
wealth also accounts for the opportunity cost in terms of capital investments.   
 
Notice that reserve accumulation will have an overall positive impact on wealth if 
the derivative 0~ rddW et ,  that is if: 
 





























As a matter of fact, considering the order of magnitude of $0
~
M , this expression can 
be satisfied independently of   , if 0
~~ Drh  , given G, h>0. This condition is the 
same that ensures that y*>0 and that V lies in the line of real numbers. Alternatively, 
if h>0, but 0G , then it is still sufficient that 0
~~ Drh  , which implies that, for 
compensating the destabilizing effect of oil income, the accumulation of reserves 
needs to be sufficiently large to cause appreciation expectations greater than the 




5. Reserve management 
 
According to the preceding sections, foreign reserves have a beneficial effect on 
contingent liabilities by acting as a mechanism to delay and mitigate currency crises. 
In this context, risk is characterized by the probability assigned to a currency crisis, 
which occurs if oil revenues fall below the threshold at which asset holders will 
massively exercise their exit option from the domestic currency.   
However, foreign reserves might cause a partial detriment on the expected wealth, 
if the return earned in international markets falls below the rate of reproduction of 
capital goods in the economy. In this case, opportunity costs are given by the 
investment opportunities foregone when holding financial resources in the form of a 
contingent asset rather than committing them to specific investments and/or 
development policies. Therefore, depending on net return earned by reserves, the 
strategy of reserve accumulation should be designed according to one of these two 
values: optimal or minimal reserves.  
 
 
5.1. Optimal reserves 
 
Assume also that country wealth is increasing in the overall value of reserves 
accumulated, but   . If the return of capital investments is higher than the return 
of reserves, the accumulation of reserves has embedded an important opportunity 
cost. On the other hand, accumulating reserves still reduces the amount of potential 
foreign liabilities and reduces the probability of a crisis, all of which encourages its 
hoarding. This tradeoff allows arguing that the stock of reserves can be determined 
optimally by setting: 
 
(25) )~(maxarg~* rWr e=          
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The FOC of this maximization problem is given by: 
 











         
where 































. This condition, as 
most maximization conditions, equates the marginal cost of accumulating reserves 
(  − ) to the marginal benefit (the absolute value of the right hand side term) in 
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This expression contains two balancing terms. The first one shows the amount of 
reserve accumulation related to the existence of autonomous depreciation 
expectations. This whole term does not depend of the uncertainty of the oil proceeds, 
and the higher these expectations, the greater the need to accumulate foreign reserves 
as an asset to counterbalance the corresponding liability. The second term contains 
the variables that induce a lower accumulation of reserves, provided that 0− : 
a greater expected oil income and smaller outstanding liabilities in the form of high 
powered money reduce the need to accumulate reserves, and so it does a reduction in 
volatility of oil income. This second term renders reserves dependent on uncertainty 
and transforms, therefore, the maximum amount of assets that would be needed to 
offset a sure liability into a form of contingent asset. 
To evaluate the impact of income volatility on optimal reserves, recall that as 
volatility increases, the absolute value of the root (
2
 ) gets smaller. Since optimal 
reserves are higher when the 2  approaches to zero, this implies that increasing 
volatility will increase the amount of optimal reserves9. This occurs because, as 
uncertainty increases, the probability of a crisis decreases, but the amount of 
contingent liabilities increases.  
The SOC of the maximization problem requires that  

















 . Since: 
 
 
9 As a matter of fact, 0~ 2



















,  which is automatically satisfied for a sufficiently 
large magnitude of the present value of the high powered money in the economy. 
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(28)







































 , then the SOC of the maximization problem is always satisfied. 
 
 
5.2. Minimal reserves as a self insurance 
 
When the difference between the return of reserves and the return of capital 
investment is positive, that is 0− ,  accumulating reserves only has beneficial 
effects. On one hand, there is an accumulation of oil proceeds in the form of the most 
productive asset available that increases wealth, and on the other hand, there is a gain 
associated to the reduction of foreign liabilities and the probability of a crisis, all of 
which encourages the hoarding of reserves. In this case, the tradeoff that called for an 
optimization procedure disappears, and the amount of reserves accumulated can be 
arbitrarily large.  
In this case, since there is not an upper bound to the accumulation of reserves, it 
would seem desirable to point out a lower bound or a minimal amount of reserves. 
This minimal amount could be established in terms of answering what level of 
reserves covers the expected foreign exchange liabilities that would arise at the time 
of a currency crisis when private agents exercise their claims. More generally, 
consider a rate of coverage () applied on the expected amount of liabilities, the 
present value of this minimum amount of reserves should exactly match the selected 
value of shielded liabilities, such that: 
 




















According to this expression, the minimal reserves should be directly proportional 
to the size of autonomous depreciation expectations, the stock of outstanding 
liabilities of domestic currency and the rate of coverage () decided by authorities. 
Nonetheless, notice that changing the amount of minimal reserves, for instance by 
varying the desired size of the coverage, modifies both, the size of expected foreign 
liabilities during a crisis and the implicit probability of a crisis. In particular, as the 
size of coverage gets larger, contingent claims are reduced, and the probability of a 
crisis gets smaller as y* diminishes10.  
 













= , which is inversely proportional to . 
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Therefore, selecting the size of the coverage against expected foreign claims 
during a crisis is identical to choosing the probability of a crisis that authorities will 
face and the amount of claims that effectively could be honored by the Central Bank. 
Because this amount of minimal reserves limits the exposure to risk according to the 
preferences revealed by authorities, they represent a form of self insurance 
mechanism against a currency crisis. This form of self insurance is in line with the 
approach followed by García y Soto (2004). 
Differently than the approach presented by Lee (2005), we do not address the 
possibility that part of the insurance against crises can be obtained through market-
based mechanisms (such as a put option) and neither can we refer to the optimal size 
of this insurance. Nevertheless, in our approach, authorities can discretionally decide 
the quality of the self insurance by evaluating its coverage in terms of the expected 




6. Estimation of reserves for Venezuela 
 
6.1. Parameters estimation. 
 
Optimal or minimal reserves can be computed through this model, if parameters 
for the expected depreciation (g and h in equation 3) are estimated. However, to 
obtain estimates of these parameters for Venezuela, we need to consider that the 
dynamic of the nominal exchange rate has varied over time due to several 
modifications applied to the exchange rate regime. To overcome this difficulty, 
instead of modeling the nominal exchange rate, we model the exchange rate market 
pressure (EMP), which allows using a sufficiently long data set on the market, 
independently of the type of exchange rate regime in place. Empirical grounds for the 
estimation of the exchange market pressure are found in the literature of currency 
crises, in particular, in the works of Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), García and 
Soto (2004) and Edwards (2004).  
Inspired in Girton and Roper (1977), the exchange rate market pressure is a 
measure that linearly combines the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate D  and 











DfEMP ,  
 
where f(.) denotes a linear function, whose coefficients are the inverse of the standard 
deviation of the variable. As it is defined, either a depreciation of the domestic 
currency or in an increase of the amount of dollars sold by the Central Bank increases 
the market pressure, capturing any change in the excess demand of foreign currency. 
During periods of exchange rate controls (dual systems), D  refers to the growth rate 
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of the parallel exchange rate, while Sl represents the amount of dollars supplied by 
authorities for commercial transactions. In periods of fixed exchange rate, the market 
pressure is completely captured by the foreign exchange sales of the Central Bank.  
The estimation of the exchange rate market pressure is carried out with a GARCH 
model to control for time heteroskedasticity. The empirical explanatory variables for 
the market pressure are the annual change in the value of yearly oil exports (y), the 
annual accumulation of reserves (r). Estimation results are shown in the appendix. 
We retrieve the coefficients of equation (3) by a two step procedure: first, by 
computing the annual (instead of the quarterly) change in the market pressure per unit 
of change in oil exports and reserve accumulation using the dynamic structure of the 
equation, and second, by transforming these market pressure coefficients in units of 
nominal exchange rate depreciation (using the standard deviation of the exchange rate 
depreciation). 
Finally, to retrieve the drift parameter ( ) for equation (9), we use the fact that the 
mean of the change of the logarithm of the annual oil exports (μ) can be expressed as 
function of the standard deviation and the drift parameter ( 25.0  −= ). Since the 
sample available for the oil exports includes the oil boom registered from 2005 to 
2008, the historical value of  is equal to 0.1, which seems a very large value to use 
as a forecast for the expected behavior of the oil revenues. We set  =0.05,   takes 
its historical value of 0.25, and compute the roots of the characteristic equation 
according to the formulas provided. The discount rate  is set at 0.15, to satisfy that 
  . Estimated coefficients are summarized in the following table: 
 










   *Coefficients are expressed in p.p. of currency depreciation per ten billions of US dollars 
 
6.2. Numerical calculations 
 
In this section, we provide numerical values for optimal and minimal reserves to 
assess the adequacy of the model for the case of Venezuela.  
The closed form expressions that we use incorporate the existence of an exchange 
rate control implemented in Venezuela since 2003. For this reason, we need to 
estimate the probability of obtaining a dollar at the official exchange rate when 
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undertaking financial transactions (the parameter q), which is pinned down to 0.2511. 
This parameter affects the average exchange rate prevailing in the economy (v), the 
amount of the high powered money in dollars valued at v, and the term P, interpreted 
as an indicator of the state of the exchange rate control. The exchange rate premium 
is computed as the wedge between the official exchange rate (Bs/$ 2.15) and the 
value of the parallel exchange rate set at Bs/$ 5.5 (an average value observed during 
2009 in the parallel market).  
In general, optimal reserves are highly dependent on the assumptions made 
regarding the current level of oil revenues (y) and the returns of capital goods and 
reserves. In this exercise, we consider several values for the annual oil income, and 
compute the expression y/, which is interpreted as the expected present value of 
receiving a constant annual oil income. However, providing a good estimate of the 
yield of capital investments goes beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we provide 
possible values for the opportunity cost of reserves (  − ), considering different 
levels of the capital investment return. Results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Optimal reserves* 
Optimal Reserves 
Opportunity Costs y 
 θ 40,000 65,000 90,000 
0.05 
0.000 35,091 28,443 21,794 
0.025 37,203 31,874 26,545 
0.049 42,678 40,771 38,864 
0.10 
0.000 32,652 24,479 16,306 
0.050 35,248 28,697 22,147 
0.099 42,723 40,844 38,965 
0.15 
0.000 31,055 21,883 12,712 
0.075 33,968 26,617 19,266 
0.149 42,765 40,913 39,060 
Mean 37,043 31,613 26,184 
Standard deviation 4,588 7,456 10,323 
   *Monetary figures are in MM of US $ 
 
According to Table 2, and to the formulas provided, the optimal reserves will 
decrease as the value of the expected oil income gets larger. Notice that, for any level 
of the return of investments, as 0→− , the optimal stocks of reserves tend to 
modestly vary around U.S.$ 40,800 MM, even for large variations in the expected oil 
income. In this case, the optimal level of reserves mostly reflects the state of the 
autonomous depreciation expectations (D0), which are parameterized around 17% per 
year. When opportunity costs are different from zero, optimal reserves, on average, 
 
11  Estimates of this parameter can be computed marginally, given the approximate size of transactions carried out in the 
parallel market and the amount of over-invoiced imports. Recent estimates of q range between 0.2 and 0.3, but they 
could be subject to important changes. 
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decrease as the return of investments in capital goods is higher. Also, a greater gap 
between   and    will reduce the need for reserves, as capital goods become a better 
option of investment than reserves.   
To illustrate the behavior of minimal reserves, we give several examples for 
different levels of the rate of coverage  and the annual autonomous depreciation 
expectations D0. Estimates are provided in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Minimal reserves* 
Minimal Reserves / Critical Oil Income 
 variable D0=0.35 D0=0.17 D0=0.085 
0.5 
rm 27,085 14,143 8,031 
y* 57,366 29,954 17,009 
1.0 rm 41,437 21,636 12,286 
 y* 43,881 22,913 13,011 
1.5 rm 50,325 26,278 14,922 
 y* 35,529 18,552 10,535 
*Monetary figures are in MM of US $ 
 
Table 3 shows that as the level of coverage increases, not only the amount of 
contingent liabilities that could be honored increases, but the risk faced in terms of 
the probability of a currency crisis diminishes. On the other hand, larger autonomous 
depreciation expectations increase the amount of minimal reserves needed to satisfy a 
given rate of coverage.   
 It is important to point out that these values of optimal and minimal reserves 
represent average values, given a stylized expected behavior of the economy. In this 
sense, this exercise neither captures the changing behavior of the economy nor does it 
consider the impact that stochastic shocks could impinge on the different variables 
involved in calculations.  
 From the point of view of policymakers, these values should be interpreted as 
merely referential and cannot be understood as the exact amount of reserves that the 
Central Bank should hold at all times. Indeed, many oil economies maintain part of 
their foreign exchange proceeds in the form of saving or investment funds, which 
tend to gain higher returns than the reserves managed by the Central Bank12. Because 
these alternative forms of savings also constitute a stock of foreign assets that can 
deter speculators from triggering a currency crisis, one could interpret these amounts 
of optimal or minimal reserves simply as the sum of foreign assets that should be 
maintained altogether at the Central Bank and at the investment fund. The allocation 
of foreign assets between these two forms of accumulation can be ultimately a 
decision of policymakers based on the desirable degree of liquidity to be achieved.  
 
 
12  In comparison to the management of reserves at the Central Bank, the greater return of these investment funds is 
generally attributed to the less conservative portfolio allocation pursued. Such financial strategy typically entails a 





In this paper we have looked at the problem of reserves from the point of view of 
their function as an instrument to control the contingent liability constituted by the 
accumulation of individual claims against the Central bank. These claims correspond 
to the issuance of high powered money denominated in domestic currency and to the 
consequent risk of massive attempt at conversion on the part of the claimholders. In 
this paper, reserves are one instrument to counteract the contingent liability with a 
correspondent contingent asset because they reduce the expectations of depreciation 
of the domestic currency and discourage contingent capital flight. In an oil dependent 
economy, these contingent values depend on the dynamic uncertainty of oil revenue, 
whose mean value and variance both tend to vary over time as a consequence of the 
myriad of factors affecting international demand and domestic supply.  Under these 
conditions, reserve accumulation can be rationally planned according to two possible 
patterns. If the return on reserves is lower than the return obtainable on the alternative 
use for the same funds, a trade off emerges between the use of foreign exchange to 
obtain maximum returns and its use to deter holders of domestic balances to convert 
their claims. In this case, “optimal reserves” can be set at a level reflecting two 
separate components: a positive one that perfectly counterbalances the expected (non 
contingent) devaluation for the outstanding claims, and a negative one, reflecting the 
contingent nature of oil revenue and of its alternative uses. As the common wisdom 
would indicate, a greater volatility of oil proceeds should be compensated with a 
higher accumulation of reserves, in order to adequately face the materialization of 
larger contingent claims. 
 When the return on reserves is sufficiently high with respect to its alternative use, 
optimal levels cannot be specified, and reserves can be accumulated in arbitrarily 
huge amounts. In this case, the accumulation of reserves can still be used as an 
insurance to limit the exposure to the risk of a currency crisis. In particular, 
“minimal” reserves can be set to guarantee honoring a selected amount of foreign 
exchange claims at the time of a crisis.  
The estimates developed for Venezuela show that the net effect of reserves on 
reducing expected depreciations is both significant and substantial. As a 
consequence, combined with the estimates of the other parameters of the model, the 
computed levels of optimal and minimal reserves appear to be reasonable with 
respect to the size and conditions of the economy. 
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Appendix 1. Estimation of Market Pressure  
 
 
Dependent Variable: EMP   
Method: ML - ARCH   
Sample (adjusted): 1991Q1 2008Q4  
Included observations: 72 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 18 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(6) + C(7)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(8)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     
 
Coefficien
t Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.259536 0.063355 4.096511 0.0000 
EMP(-1) 1.221471 0.102548 11.91120 0.0000 
EMP(-2) -0.394840 0.112410 -3.512481 0.0004 
 y -1.43E-05 8.48E-06 -1.688596 0.0913 
 r (-1) -4.39E-05 1.68E-05 -2.613750 0.0090 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.028590 0.026688 1.071273 0.2840 
RESID(-1)^2 0.327440 0.246430 1.328734 0.1839 
GARCH(-1) 0.494078 0.223569 2.209957 0.0271 
     
     R-squared 0.925534     Mean dependent var 0.774564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.917390     S.D. dependent var 1.409578 
S.E. of regression 0.405141     Akaike info criterion 1.035834 
Sum squared resid 10.50492     Schwarz criterion 1.288796 
Log likelihood -29.29001     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.136539 
F-statistic 113.6367     Durbin-Watson stat 1.727430 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
EMP: market pressure (in standardized units) 
y: the annual change of the value of yearly oil exports (in millions of US $) 
r: the annual accumulation of international reserves (in millions of US $) 
